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COMMENT

AIR POLLUTION AS PUBLIC NUISANCE: COMPARING
MODERN-DAY GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT WITH
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SMOKE ABATEMENT
Kate Markey*
Public nuisance allows plaintiffs to sue actors in tort for causing environmental harm that disrupts the public’s use and enjoyment of the land. In recent
years, state and local governments have filed public nuisance actions against
oil companies, hoping to hold them responsible for the harm of climate change.
Since no plaintiff has prevailed on the merits so far, whether these lawsuits are
worth bringing, given the other legal avenues available, remains an open question. This Comment situates these actions in their appropriate historical context to show that these lawsuits are neither unprecedented nor futile. In
particular, it examines the use of nuisance actions in the successful abatement
of “the smoke evil” in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to illustrate
how nuisance law develops over time, interacts with other forms of environmental regulation, and encourages the development of new technology. This
Comment concludes that plaintiffs can in fact succeed on the merits, and, regardless of their success, climate nuisance suits can promote stricter federal
regulation, serve an expressive function, and incentivize the development of
air pollution abatement technology.
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INTRODUCTION
As of September 2021, there were thirteen pending public nuisance lawsuits against major oil companies seeking to abate the harm 1 of climate

1. This Comment uses the term “abate the harm” as a shorthand for the monetary contribution plaintiffs seek from oil companies in climate nuisance suits. Climate nuisance plaintiffs
want oil companies to foot the bill for damage caused by climate change. For example, in its
complaint, the City of Annapolis describes how the oil companies’ choice to promote fossil fuels
has led to “attendant tidal flooding in Annapolis” and “increased frequency and intensity of extreme weather events in and around Annapolis.” Flooding and other extreme weather mean Annapolis will suffer monetary loss from damage to infrastructure and a decline in tourism revenue.
It will also need to pay for costly interventions like seawalls. Climate nuisance suits like Annapolis’s ask oil companies to compensate municipalities for this harm. Complaint at 136–37, City
of Annapolis v. BP P.L.C., No. C-02-CV-21-000250 (Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 22, 2021).
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change. 2 These lawsuits, primarily brought by state and local governments, 3
seek compensatory and equitable relief for the environmental harm caused by
climate change. The current wave of public nuisance lawsuits is the latest step
in a string of recent attempts to hold oil companies liable in tort. 4 Many legal
commentators have argued that while these tort lawsuits initially inspire
“enormous bombast and press attention,” they all inevitably end up entangled
in technicalities of the law and unable to succeed on the merits. 5
In fact, in May 2021, the Supreme Court published a decision in BP P.L.C.
v. Mayor of Baltimore, a case that concerned one such technical hurdle. 6 The
city of Baltimore brought the case against twenty-six oil companies to hold
them liable for the harm of climate change. 7 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
the question presented concerned a narrow, technical issue of federal appellate
jurisdiction—specifically, the scope of appellate review of district court orders
to remand cases back to state court. 8 The issue in the case seemed inconsequential and minor on its face. But in reality, it arose from a coordinated and

2. Id.; Complaint, Anne Arundel Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., No. C-02-CV-21-000565 (Md. Cir.
Ct. Apr. 26, 2021); Complaint, Cnty. of Maui v. Sunoco LP, No. 2CCV-20-0000283 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Oct. 12, 2020); Complaint, State v. BP Am. Inc., N20C-09-097 (Del. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2020);
Complaint, City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., No. 2020-CP-1003975 (S.C. Ct. C.P. Sept. 9,
2020); Complaint, City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HUD-L-003179-20 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Sept. 2, 2020); Complaint, City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Mar. 9, 2020); Complaint, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No.
CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018); Complaint, Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder
Cnty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., No. 2018CV030349 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Apr. 17, 2018); Complaint, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct. Jul. 20, 2018); Complaint, State v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. Jul. 2, 2018); Complaint,
People v. BP P.L.C., No. RG17875889 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 2017); Complaint, Cnty. of San
Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 17CIV03222 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017).
3. Twelve of the thirteen lawsuits were brought by state and local governments, and one
was brought by a Fishermen’s Association. See supra note 2.
4. For a brief overview of recent attempts to regulate fossil fuels through tort law, see
Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice Movement: The Right Thing and
the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV. 197, 214–23 (2010).
5. Walter Olson, Municipal Climate Suits and Lawsuit Diplomacy, CATO INST. (May 31,
2018, 8:32 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/municipal-climate-suits-lawsuit-diplomacy [perma.
cc/HW29-YBE2]; see also Albert C. Lin, Dodging Public Nuisance, 11 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 489,
502–04 (2020) (discussing the role of standing and the political question doctrine in dismissing
climate change public nuisance cases); Laura Flahive Wu & Nicole Antoine, What Evolution of
Public Nuisance Claims Means for Cos., LAW360 (Oct. 25, 2021, 5:29 PM), https://www.law360.
com/corporate/articles/1433833 [perma.cc/9FDD-QD9D] (noting that most climate change public nuisance lawsuits “have been unsuccessful”).
6. 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021).
7. Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 548 (D. Md. 2019), vacated, 141
S. Ct. 1532 (2021).
8. BP, 141 S. Ct. at 1536. More specifically, BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore concerned
the scope of federal appellate review under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). The Court held that when a
defendant raises federal officer removal under § 1442 and the district court remands the case
back to state court, on appeal to the circuit court, the court may review all bases of removal, not
just removal under § 1442. Id. at 1537–38.
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calculated project on the part of major oil companies to avoid liability. 9 Together, they are defending against climate change litigation with an array of
procedural arguments designed to get lawsuits dismissed before a decision on
the merits. The Court’s decision in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore has
brought these companies one small step closer to shutting the door on climate
tort liability altogether. 10 Indeed, for an entire year, some of these thirteen
public nuisance lawsuits had been stayed in anticipation of the Supreme
Court’s ruling in BP, which kept judges from reaching the merits of the underlying tort claims. 11 And while the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision did
not render these lawsuits void, it added one more procedural hurdle for plaintiffs to overcome.
Today, the detrimental impact of CO2 emissions on the health of our
planet is clear. 12 Immediate action is needed to reduce fossil fuel production
and to keep the global temperature within a safe level. 13 During the Trump
Administration, the executive branch rolled back environmental regulations,
and the president himself failed to accept the link between climate change and
natural disasters. 14 While President Biden has committed to cutting carbon

9. See infra Section I.D.
10. As this Comment will explain in further detail infra in Section I.D, the oil companies
will need to make it past several additional procedural hurdles before they are actually insulated
from tort liability altogether.
11. City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 20-cv-00163 (D. Haw. Mar. 5, 2021) (order denying motion to stay execution of remand order and granting temporary stay to seek relief before
the Ninth Circuit); King Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-cv-00758 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 9, 2020) (order
continuing stay); Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-cv07477 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2020) (joint request from the parties to stay a case management conference until after a Supreme Court decision). Many other cases also filed petitions for certiorari
raising the same arguments as the parties in Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C. These cases were
effectively stayed in anticipation of a decision as well. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Suncor
Energy (U.S.A.) Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty., 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2020) (No. 20783); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Shell Oil Prods. Co. v. Rhode Island, 141 S. Ct. 2666 , (2020)
(No. 20-900); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chevron Corp. v. Cnty. of San Mateo, 141 S. Ct.
2666 (2020) (No. 20-884); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Chevron Corp. v. City of Oakland, 141
S. Ct. 2776 (2021) (No. 20-1089).
12. See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, ‘Bleak’ U.N. Report on a Planet in Peril Looms Over New
Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/26/climate/greenhouse-gas-emissions-carbon.html [perma.cc/RB27-E956]; World Meteorological Org. & Glob.
Atmosphere Watch, The State of Greenhouse Gases in the Atmosphere Based on Global Observations Through 2018, WMO GREENHOUSE GAS BULL. 2–3 (Nov. 25, 2019) (finding global atmospheric CO2 had increased 147% since the year 1750).
13. Specifically, experts argue that we must keep global temperature increase below 1.5 degrees Celsius in comparison to pre-industrial levels. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5 °C (2019), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/06/SR15_Full_Report_High_Res.pdf [perma.cc/XN3V-KJUH].
14. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Lisa Friedman & Thomas Kaplan, As Trump Again Rejects
Science, Biden Calls Him a ‘Climate Arsonist,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/14/us/politics/trump-biden-climate-change-fires.html [perma.cc/PB8F-JL26]
(describing President Trump’s refusal to acknowledge that climate change played a part in the
unprecedented scale of devastation from the 2020 wildfires on the West Coast).
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emissions in half by 2030, getting enough congressional votes to codify the
proposal into law will be next to impossible. 15 Ultimately, an aggressive attack
on climate change would require radical legislation—such as the proposed
Green New Deal—and with the filibuster in place, reaching the required sixty
votes in the Senate is unlikely. 16
In the absence of a strong federal response, state and local governments,
environmental groups, and concerned citizens have turned to the courts to
address the harm of climate change themselves. The past decade has seen an
explosion of creative lawsuits using constitutional, statutory, and common
law theories to hold our government and the major producers of greenhouse
gas emissions accountable. 17 This Comment solely addresses one type of litigation: public nuisance actions against oil companies, shorthanded as “climate
nuisance suits.”
Public nuisance is a cause of action notorious for its ambiguity. 18 In 1875,
legal scholar Horace Wood described it as the “wilderness of law,” and in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, William Prosser referred to it as a “legal garbage can.” 19 Although each state’s definition of public nuisance varies, at its
core is the Latin maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, or use your own
so long as you do not harm another. 20 In modern terms, proving a public nuisance claim requires showing that someone has caused harm that interferes

15. Brady Dennis & Juliet Eilperin, Biden Plans to Cut Emissions at Least in Half by 2030,
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2021, 3:19 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2021/04/20/biden-climate-change [perma.cc/A4C8-3BFE]; see Lisa Friedman, It’s Crunch
Time and Biden’s Climate Gambit Faces Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/05/22/climate/clean-electricity-climate.html [perma.cc/5AUL-AGYL].
16. H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposed Green New Deal legislation); see also
Molly E. Reynolds, What Is the Senate Filibuster, and What Would It Take to Eliminate It?,
BROOKINGS INST.: POLICY 2020 (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/what-is-the-senate-filibuster-and-what-would-it-take-to-eliminate-it [perma.cc/T58F-X7HS]
(describing the Senate filibuster).
17. For an excellent overview of recent climate change litigation, see Sabin Ctr. for Climate Change L. at Columbia L. Sch. & Arnold & Porter, Climate Change Litigation Databases,
CLIMATE CASE CHART, http://climatecasechart.com [perma.cc/AYZ3-GWGZ].
18. While this Comment largely concerns public nuisance suits, many of the climate nuisance suits also raise companion claims of private nuisance. The difference between public and
private nuisance is the actor that is harmed. If something interferes with the public’s use and
enjoyment of the land, then it is a public nuisance claim. Nuisance, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nuisance [perma.cc/GG5E-S3JW]. If something interferes with
a private actor’s use and enjoyment of the land, then it is a private nuisance claim. In climate
nuisance suits, since the plaintiff is a state or local government, the public nuisance claims assert
that climate change interferes with the public community’s use and enjoyment of public land.
The coordinate private nuisance claims assert that climate change interferes with the government’s own use and enjoyment of the land.
19. Richard O. Faulk & John S. Gray, Public Nuisance at the Crossroads: Policing the Intersection Between Statutory Primacy and Common Law, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 495, 500 (2012) (quoting Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENV’T AFFS. L. REV. 89, 90 (1998)).
20. Id.
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with the public’s use and enjoyment of land. 21 Because of its vague, openended definition, public nuisance has become the tort of choice for activists
challenging widespread societal harm. Public nuisance was the backbone of
the successful tort litigation against the tobacco industry, the ongoing litigation against the lead paint industry, and now, against major producers of fossil
fuels. 22
Many critics of current climate nuisance suits accuse plaintiffs of asking
courts to use public nuisance in an utterly unprecedented manner, expanding
the tort beyond its appropriate, historical bounds to seek redress for a diffuse
harm. 23 Without clear precedent, judges presiding over these suits question
the ability of the courts to balance the harm of climate change against the economic necessity of producing fossil fuels. 24 To other critics, climate nuisance
suits could have merit but are a distraction from other more viable forms of
regulation. In particular, the suits draw attention away from the proper venue
for making lasting change: using the Clean Air Act (CAA) or similar statelevel legislation to regulate fossil fuels more aggressively. 25 By examining the
historical use of nuisance law to address air pollution, this Comment refutes
these criticisms and argues that climate nuisance suits play a critical role in
the abatement of greenhouse gases from our atmosphere.
Using public nuisance to address air pollution is nothing new. In the late
nineteenth century, as the United States industrialized, new factories burned
dirty coal that polluted cities with dense, black smoke. 26 In response, individ-

21. See, e.g., Complaint at 118–21, City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HUD-L003179-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Sept. 2. 2020) (describing New Jersey’s common law tort of public
nuisance as prohibiting “[d]efendants from causing ‘an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public’ ” that is “substantial and unreasonable” and causes harm).
22. Faulk & Gray, supra note 19, at 497–98.
23. See, e.g., Daniel E. Lungren et al., Originally Speaking: Climate Change and Common
Law Public Nuisance, FEDERALIST SOC’Y: FEDSOC BLOG (Dec. 7, 2018), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/originally-speaking-climate-change-and-common-law-public-nuisanceopening-response [perma.cc/95N2-3CY2] (“[The suits] focus on assertions of liability for climate change impacts and response costs based on common law claims of public nuisance . . . . To do so, though, such common law claims would need to be twisted upon themselves
to reject traditional limits on liability.”).
24. For example, Judge Alsup, a California judge presiding over a climate nuisance suit,
recently remarked, “[w]e won the Second World War with fossil fuels. If we didn’t have fossil
fuels, we would have lost that war and every other war . . . . [W]e have gotten a huge benefit from
the use of fossil fuels, right?” Editorial, The Climate-Change Tort Racket, WALL ST. J. (June 8,
2018, 7:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-climate-change-tort-racket-1528499384
[perma.cc/CH2E-DRZW].
25. David A. Dana, The Mismatch Between Public Nuisance Law and Global Warming, 18
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 9 (2010); Umair Irfan, Pay Attention to the Growing Wave of Climate
Change Lawsuits, VOX (June 4, 2019, 11:13 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/2/22/17140166/climate-change-lawsuit-exxon-juliana-liability-kids [perma.cc/Q3TCWWFA].
26. FRANK UEKOETTER, THE AGE OF SMOKE 20 (2009).
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ual citizens sued factory owners, formed grassroots smoke abatement societies, and lobbied local governments to regulate smoke. 27 As this Comment
shows, nuisance lawsuits played an integral role in the eventual abatement of
the so-called “smoke evil.” 28 Although it is true that no plaintiff in a climate
nuisance suit has actually won on the merits, 29 an examination of the historical
role of public nuisance in abating air pollution reveals that plaintiffs in similar
suits have succeeded on the merits before. Moreover, the historical record
shows that public nuisance actions can work symbiotically with other forms
of regulation, serving a valuable role in pushing for the adoption of stricter
regulation and supporting the development of new abatement technology.
By drawing parallels between smoke nuisance suits and climate nuisance
suits, this Comment pushes back against the criticism lodged at climate nuisance suits and highlights three potential benefits of the suits in the fight to
abate greenhouse gases: the possibility of success on the merits, the ability to
push for stricter federal regulations, and the positive expressive and innovative value of the litigation. Part I discusses the current state of climate nuisance
suits percolating through the state and federal courts. Part II looks back at the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to show the integral role smoke nuisance suits played in the abatement of the smoke evil. Part III compares smoke
nuisance suits and climate nuisance suits to highlight the important contributions that climate nuisance suits provide in the movement to abate greenhouse
gases.
I.

WHERE WE ARE: THE CURRENT STATUS OF CLIMATE NUISANCE SUITS

To date, no court has had the opportunity to consider the merits of a public nuisance claim in any climate nuisance suit. Some suits have been dismissed on procedural grounds, while in others, procedural issues are pending
before federal and state courts. Part I details how the interaction between the
CAA and common law has tied the climate nuisance suits up in a complex
web of procedural defenses, preventing courts from reaching the merits on the
question of whether oil companies can and should be held liable for damage
caused by climate change. Section I.A provides a brief overview of the regulation of greenhouse gases under the CAA. Section I.B outlines the displacement
of federal common law by the CAA, while Section I.C explains the uncertainty
around the CAA’s preemption of state common law. Section I.D details how
oil companies have used the law around displacement and preemption to
avoid liability in the current wave of climate nuisance suits.

27. See infra Part II; UEKOETTER, supra note 26, at 20–42.
28. See infra Section II.A.
29. See infra Section III.A; see also Marian Conway, Climate Nuisance Lawsuits Need a
Major Win, NPQ (July 2, 2018), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/climate-nuisance-lawsuits-needa-major-win [perma.cc/MA25-EN6Z].
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A. The Clean Air Act and Federal Regulation of Fossil Fuels
The CAA, passed in 1970, seeks to “protect and enhance the quality of the
Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare.” 30 The
CAA was the first comprehensive piece of federal legislation to regulate air
pollution in the United States. 31 Before its enactment, the nation had a patchwork of legislation: some individual municipalities had air pollutant ordinances, 32 and all fifty states had a state-specific statute restricting air pollution,
most of which were passed in the 1960s. 33 In addition, individual plaintiffs
seeking to abate air pollution in their communities brought common law public and private nuisance actions. 34
Under the CAA, the EPA can regulate “air pollutants,” broadly defined
within the statute as any “matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air.” 35 Despite this broad definition, the EPA’s stance before 2007 was
that greenhouse gases were not air pollutants as defined by the CAA, and thus
it had no obligation to regulate their emission. 36 Then, in 2007, the Supreme
Court ordered the EPA to start regulating greenhouse gases contributing to
climate change in Massachusetts v. EPA. 37 The plaintiffs brought the suit under the CAA’s citizen suit provision, which allows individuals to petition for
review of EPA action in promulgating “any national . . . ambient air quality
standard.” 38 They alleged that, by refusing to regulate the greenhouse gas
emissions from new motor vehicles, the EPA failed to meet its mandate under

30. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1).
31. Three pieces of federal legislation concerning air pollution preceded the CAA: the Air
Pollution Control Act of 1955, the Clean Air Act of 1963, and the Air Quality Act of 1967. These
statutes were primarily focused on funding research into the causes of air pollution and techniques to abate pollution. Evolution of the Clean Air Act, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.
gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-clean-air-act [perma.cc/Y97R-U7F2].
32. See, e.g., State v. Mundet Cork Corp., 86 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1952) (holding that the Mundet
Cork Corporation violated the air pollutant ordinance in the Township of Hillside).
33. Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 44, 46 (1982). The vast majority of these state statutes were passed
in the 1960s. Before 1960, only seven states had an air pollution statute. Id.
34. See, e.g., Dauberman v. Grant, 246 P. 319 (Cal. 1926) (considering an appeal from an
injunction against a factory under nuisance for emitting smoke).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g).
36. See, e.g., EPA Denies Petition to Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY (Aug. 28, 2003), https://archive.epa.gov/epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/694c8f3b7c16ff6085256d900065fdad.html [perma.cc/MB7K-YEQF] (“The
Agency is denying the petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles [because] Congress has not granted EPA authority under the Clean Air Act to regulate CO2 and
other greenhouse gases for climate change purposes.”).
37. 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1).
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the CAA to regulate air pollution that “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 39 The Court agreed, rejecting the EPA’s argument that Congress never intended greenhouse gases to be regulated
because they did not qualify as air pollutants. 40
In the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA, the EPA finally acknowledged the
“unambiguous warming trend” that threatens public health and welfare. 41 It
began to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles 42 and from stationary sources of emissions, such as factories. 43 Still, the agency faced criticism
that it was not doing nearly enough, leading state and local governments to
continue to sue greenhouse gas emitters directly. 44 One strategy utilized by
litigants at the time was bringing public nuisance lawsuits, in which challengers argued that factories emitting greenhouse gases were interfering with the
public’s use and enjoyment of the land. 45 Plaintiffs in this first wave of tort
litigation following Massachusetts v. EPA primarily relied on federal public
nuisance claims, which the Supreme Court later held were invalid.
B. Displacement of Federal Common Law
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided in American Electric Power Co. v.
Connecticut that the CAA “displaced” federal public nuisance law, rendering
federal public nuisance claims void. 46 The concept of displacement comes
from the Court’s foundational decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.47
39. 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
40. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511, 528. The CAA defines “air pollutant” as “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” 42
U.S.C. § 7602(g).
41. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under
Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,506 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1); 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1).
42. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85,
86, 600; 49 C.F.R. pts. 531, 533, 536, 537, 538); Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel
Efficiency Standards for Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152
(Nov. 30, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 1036, 1037, 1065, 1066, 1068; 49 C.F.R.
pts. 523, 534, 535).
43. Specifically, the EPA began requiring stationary sources of greenhouse gas emissions
to apply “best available control technology” (BACT) to reduce emissions. 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4);
Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg.
31,514, 31,520–21 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, 71).
44. See, e.g., Giuliana Viglione, Climate Lawsuits Are Breaking New Legal Ground to Protect the Planet, NATURE (Feb. 28, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-00175-5
[perma.cc/VW5J-AN2G]; Editorial, Abdicating, Again, on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/opinion/sunday/trump-climate-clean-power-plan.html
[perma.cc/NC5F-QTPW].
45. See, e.g., Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011).
46. Id. at 424.
47. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Since Erie, federal courts’ ability to create common law—like a common law
federal public nuisance claim—has been much narrower than that of state
courts; they can only create common law in a handful of enumerated areas. 48
Whenever a federal statute regulates the conduct at issue in a federal common
law claim, the common law claim is said to be “displaced,” and the court must
dismiss it. 49 The touchstone for determining whether a statute regulates the
underlying conduct of a claim is whether the statute speaks “directly to [the]
question at issue.” 50 Because federal common law is so rare and disfavored
after Erie, displacement is a relatively easy standard to meet.
During the Massachusetts v. EPA litigation, a group of states filed a complaint against a group of electric power companies, bringing claims for federal
public nuisance and state public nuisance. 51 In the case American Electric
Power, the plaintiffs alleged that the power plants were engaging in intentional
or negligent conduct by emitting fossil fuels that unreasonably interfered with
the public’s right to physical comfort and enjoyment of the land. 52 In 2010,
the Supreme Court granted certiorari in American Electric Power to decide
whether the EPA’s recent efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions displaced federal common law, foreclosing the plaintiffs’ ability to bring a federal
public nuisance claim against the power plants. 53 By the time American Electric Power was before the Supreme Court, the EPA had started to develop its
standards for greenhouse gas emissions from both vehicles and stationary
sources. 54 Thus, the Supreme Court held that the CAA displaced any federal
common law right to “seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fos-

48. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 421; Erie R.R. Co., 304 U.S. at 64. Courts have recognized federal common law in areas of “uniquely federal interests . . . so committed by the Constitution and laws of the United States to federal control.” Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S.
500, 504 (1988) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). One such area of uniquely
federal interests is where a case implicates the “obligations to and rights of the United States
under its contracts.” Id. Another is where a case involves “civil liability of federal officials for
actions taken in the course of their duty.” Id. at 505. In Boyle, the Court extended federal common law outside of these two narrow applications, but the broader interpretation has not been
embraced by the Court since. Id. at 507.
49. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424.
50. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
51. Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(No. 04 Civ. 5669). While the Supreme Court eventually held that the federal common law claim
was displaced, it remanded the state common law claim for a decision on the merits. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 564 U.S. at 426, 429. Unfortunately, there is no subsequent history on the case available. It is likely that the parties settled out of court on the state law claim.
52. Complaint at 46–50, Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No.
04 Civ. 5669). The plaintiff’s federal common law claim of “interstate nuisance” grew from a
series of Supreme Court decisions that allowed states to bring lawsuits to abate in-state pollution
generated by out-of-state polluters. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 418–19; see, e.g., Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
53. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 415.
54. See supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
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sil-fuel fired powerplants” as the statute already spoke to the emissions at issue. 55 Since American Electric Power, federal public nuisance claims against
greenhouse gas emitters have been off the table for litigants, but the door remains open for state public nuisance claims. 56
C. The Clean Air Act and Preemption of State Common Law
While showing that a federal statute displaces federal common law only
requires demonstrating that the statute directly regulates the conduct at issue,
the standard for whether a federal statute preempts state common law is
harder to meet. To hold that a federal statute has preempted a state common
law claim, a court must specifically find “evidence of a clear and manifest [congressional] purpose.” 57 As litigants have continued to bring climate nuisance
suits under state nuisance law, division has developed among lower courts as
to whether the CAA preempts state common law actions. 58
The Fourth Circuit held in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority that the CAA preempts all state common law claims seeking redress from air pollution. 59 In reaching its decision, the court emphasized the
comprehensive nature of the CAA and the scientific complexity of air pollution. 60 It reasoned that if common law suits allowed individual states to impose injunctions against power plants based on standards that differed from
those imposed by the CAA, they could undermine the “federal-state framework that Congress through the EPA has refined over many years.” 61 In essence, the court found that Congress had a clear and manifest purpose to
preempt state common law claims in enacting the CAA because these suits
would undoubtedly undermine that framework. 62
In contrast, in Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, the Third Circuit held
that the CAA does not preempt state common law claims. 63 The court drew
55. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424.
56. Id. at 429.
57. Id. at 423 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,
317 (1981)).
58. See, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291 (4th Cir.
2010) (holding that the CAA preempts state tort law); Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 734
F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that the CAA does not preempt state tort law).
59. Cooper, 615 F.3d at 296–301.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 298; see also Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 74 (Iowa 2014).
62. See Cooper, 615 F.3d at 306, 311–12 (“No matter how lofty the goal, we are unwilling
to sanction the least predictable and the most problematic method for resolving interstate emissions disputes, a method which would chaotically upend an entire body of clean air law and
could all too easily redound to the detriment of the environment itself.”).
63. 734 F.3d 188 (3rd Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit has also considered whether the
CAA preempts state common law, but in the narrower context of whether the 1990 amendments
to the CAA to regulate Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) preempted a products liability lawsuit against a manufacturer of MTBE. See In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods.
Liab. Litig., 725 F.3d 65 (2d Cir. 2013).
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an analogy between the CAA and the Clean Water Act (CWA), as the two
statutes share nearly identical “savings clauses.” 64 These clauses preserve the
ability of “any person” to “seek enforcement” of a right they possess at common law or under another statute. 65 In an earlier Supreme Court decision,
International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, the Court had held that the CWA did not
preempt all state common law claims because of the savings clause. 66 The
Third Circuit reasoned that the same logic applied to the nearly identical CAA
savings clause; the CAA did not preempt the plaintiff’s state common law
claims. 67 Simply put, the savings clause indicated congressional intent to allow
for state law claims, and therefore there was no clear and manifest purpose to
preempt in the statute.
Overall, the state of preemption remains unsettled, with a slight preference for allowing state tort law claims to continue. Shortly after the Fourth
Circuit’s 2010 decision in Cooper, two district courts, one inside the Fourth
Circuit and one outside, endorsed the Fourth Circuit’s view that the CAA
preempts state tort law. 68 But, since the Third Circuit’s later 2013 decision in
Bell, the overwhelming majority of federal and state courts that have addressed the issue have allowed state tort law claims concerning air pollution
to proceed. 69 Therefore, bringing a state law public nuisance lawsuit against
major polluters remains a viable option in most jurisdictions. Still, defendant
64. Bell, 734 F.3d at 195.
65. Id. at 191, 194. The CAA’s savings clause states “[n]othing in this section shall restrict
any right which any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to
seek enforcement of any emission standard or limitation or to seek any other relief,” while the
CWA’s savings clause states “[n]othing in this section shall restrict any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any
effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief.” 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(e).
66. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987); Bell, 734 F.3d at 198.
67. Bell, 734 F.3d at 197–98.
68. See Ben Snowden, Clean Air Act Preemption of State-Law Tort Claims Since AEP v.
Connecticut, ENV’T LITIG. & TOXIC TORTS COMM. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass’n, Chicago, Ill.), July
2015, at 16; United States v. EME Homer City Generation L.P., 823 F. Supp. 2d 274 (W.D. Pa.
2011) (holding that the CAA preempted a state public nuisance claim); Comer v. Murphy Oil
USA, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d 849 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (holding that the CAA preempted a state public
nuisance claim against fossil fuel producers).
69. See Snowden, supra note 68, at 18; Merrick v. Diageo Americas Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d
685, 686 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding that the CAA did not preempt a state law nuisance claim
against a whiskey distillery producing ethanol emissions); Little v. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 33
F. Supp. 3d 791, 817 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (holding the CAA did not preempt a state law nuisance
claim against power company producing coal ash); Brown-Forman Corp. v. Miller, 528 S.W.3d
886 (Ky. 2017) (holding the CAA did not preempt a state law nuisance claim against a distillery
for ethanol emissions); Sciscoe v. Enbridge Gathering, 519 S.W.3d 171, 186 (Tex. App. 2015),
rev’d on other grounds, Town of Dish v. Atmos Energy Corp., 519 S.W.3d 605 (Tex. 2017) (holding the CAA did not preempt a state law nuisance claim against a natural gas facility); Freeman
v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 94 (Iowa 2014) (holding that the CAA did not
preempt a state law nuisance claim against a grain processing plant); Alleyne v. Diageo USVI,
Inc., No. SX-13-CV-143, 2015 WL 5511688, at *5 (V.I. Super. Ct. Sept. 17, 2015) (holding that
the CAA did not preempt a claim of public nuisance under Virgin Islands law).
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oil companies have succeeded in tying up climate nuisance suits by removing
them to federal courts in the hopes of getting them dismissed outright.
D. Procedural Gamesmanship in Climate Nuisance Suits
All thirteen of the climate nuisance suits referenced at the beginning of
this Comment have followed a predictable course of events. 70 First, a city or
county files a complaint in state court against an oil company like Exxon or
Mobil, asserting state law tort claims of public and private nuisance. 71 Next,
the defendant company files a notice of removal, arguing that the case is removable to federal court because while the plaintiff has styled her complaint
in state law, the case, in reality, presents a federal question. 72
In most cases, the plaintiff is the “master of [their] complaint”; they have
complete control to articulate the claims brought, state or federal, and neither
the court nor the defendant can alter them. 73 Still, defendants across jurisdictions are urging courts to recognize the applicability of narrow procedural
reasons why the claims in climate nuisance suits are actually federal common
law claims. 74 Conveniently for defendants, the Supreme Court took these
same federal common law claims off the table years ago in American Electric
Power. 75 Thus, if a court finds for the defendants on the procedural issue of
removal, it necessarily decides that the case must be dismissed outright before
reaching the merits.
Defendants typically present eight distinct reasons (or a subset of these
reasons) for removal to federal court: the claims (1) arise under federal com-

70. See supra note 2.
71. Across all the complaints, the public nuisance and private nuisance claims require the
same proof. The only difference is the entity that is harmed. For a public nuisance claim, the
plaintiff government alleges that climate change will harm the public, whereas in the private nuisance claim the government alleges that climate change will harm the government itself. See, e.g.,
Complaint at 120–26, Cnty. of Maui v. Sunoco LP, No. 2CCV-20-0000283 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Oct.
12, 2020). The complaints often bring additional causes of action in tort beyond public and private nuisance. For instance, the city of Charleston brought six state causes of action in its complaint against Brabham Oil: public nuisance, private nuisance, strict liability failure to warn,
negligent failure to warn, trespass, and a claim under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices
Act. Complaint at 120–36, City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., No. 2020-CP-1003975 (S.C.
Ct. C.P. Sept. 9, 2020).
72. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts have jurisdiction over civil cases that present
federal questions, including “actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.” If a case presents a federal question, the defendant can seek removal to federal
court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. See, e.g., Notice of Removal, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-cv-7477 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018).
73. Gil Seinfeld, Climate Change Litigation in the Federal Courts: Jurisdictional Lessons
from California v. BP, 117 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 25, 27 (2018).
74. See, e.g., Notice of Removal at 3–14, City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 20-cv-00163
(D. Haw. Apr. 15, 2020).
75. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
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mon law, (2) raise disputed and substantial issues of federal law, (3) are completely preempted by the CAA, 76 (4) are based on conduct that occurred on
federal enclaves, (5) fall under the federal Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
(OCSLA), (6) fall under federal admiralty jurisdiction, (7) fall under the bankruptcy removal statute, or (8) fall under the federal officer removal statute. 77
District courts ruling on the merits of these motions have thus far reached a
variety of different conclusions.
Most district courts have held that none of the theories of removal are
applicable in climate nuisance suits, remanding the cases to state court. In
Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., the District of Maryland knocked out all eight
theories of removal and remanded the case to state court, reasoning that it did
not have jurisdiction over a complaint raising state law claims. 78 The District
of Rhode Island ruled similarly in Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., holding removal was improper because, at its heart, Rhode Island’s complaint presented
“thoroughly state-law claims” in which the “rights, duties, and rules of decision implicated . . . are all supplied by state law.” 79 In San Mateo v. Chevron
Corp., the Northern District of California similarly denounced all theories of
removal presented, reasoning that the defendants did not show that the case
fit into any one of the “small boxes” of federal jurisdiction. 80
In contrast, in City of New York v. BP P.L.C., the Southern District of New
York embraced BP’s argument that the claims brought in the case, while labeled as state law claims in the complaint, were actually federal law claims. 81

76. “Complete preemption” is a distinct concept from preemption of state law, which is
much broader. See Seinfeld, supra note 73, at 31 (“[Complete preemption] enables defendants
to remove to federal court on an ‘arising under’ theory even when the plaintiff’s complaint relies
exclusively on state law. The doctrine is rooted in the notion that, in some instances, Congress
enacts statutes that ‘so completely pre-empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising [a]
select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.’ ”) (alteration in original) (quoting
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63–64 (1987)).
77. Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 952 F.3d 452, 458 (4th Cir. 2020), vacated, 141 S. Ct.
1532 (2021).
78. Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 388 F. Supp. 3d 538, 539 (D. Md. 2019), vacated, 141
S. Ct. 1532 (2021).
79. Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 151 (D.R.I. 2019). Specifically,
the court considered, and ultimately rejected, five theories of removal: complete preemption,
Grable jurisdiction, OCSLA jurisdiction, federal enclave jurisdiction, and the applicability of the
federal bankruptcy-removal statute. Id. at 147–52.
80. Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 939 (N.D. Cal. 2018); see
also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 405 F. Supp. 3d 947
(D. Colo. 2019).
81. The companies’ argument that the complaint presented federal common law claims
was part of a motion to dismiss the case outright. Rather than delineating all eight theories for
removal, the company merely argued that the case presented federal common law claims. See
City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff’d, 993 F.3d 81 (2d Cir.
2021).
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The court believed federal common law governed because the control of interstate pollution is a “uniquely federal interest[].” 82 The court emphasized the
breadth of the harm asserted in New York’s case; the city sought compensation for “transboundary” emissions and “worldwide fossil fuel production.” 83
By labeling the claims as federal common law, the court’s decision necessarily
required the case to be dismissed because those claims were displaced by the
CAA under American Election Power. 84 Similarly, in California v. BP P.L.C.,
the Northern District of California agreed that the climate nuisance suit presented federal common law because “the scope of the worldwide predicament
demands the most comprehensive view available.” 85
As of November 2021, seven climate nuisance suits had reached federal
appellate courts for review. 86 Typically, when a party appeals a case, the appellate court reviews the entire certified record and can address any and all arguments that the lower court relied on to reach a decision. However, the
appellate review for remand orders to state court falls under a special statutory
limitation, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 87 Since 1949, circuit courts have generally
been unable to review district court orders to remand cases to state court at
all. 88 § 1447(d) carved out two exceptions: one for appellate review of civil
rights violations and another for appellate review of federal officer removal
claims. 89 Federal officer removal is one of the eight theories typically raised by
defendants in climate nuisance suits. 90
Before the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, it was unclear whether § 1447(d) allowed a circuit court to review a
claim for federal officer removal and all other bases of removal raised, or just

82. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471 (quoting Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451
U.S. 630, 630 (1981)).
83. Id. at 471–72.
84. Id. at 472–73.
85. No. C 17-06011, 2018 WL 1064293, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
86. These cases fall into two categories: (1) defendant challenges to remand orders and
(2) plaintiff challenges to dismissals. For defendant challenges to remand orders, see Mayor of
Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., 952 F.3d 452 (4th Cir. 2020), vacated, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021); City & Cnty.
of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 21-15313, 2021 WL 1017392 (9th Cir. Mar. 13, 2021); Bd. of
Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy, Inc., 965 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2020); Rhode Island
v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 979 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2020); Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 960
F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 2020). For plaintiff challenges to dismissal, see City of New York v. Chevron
Corp., 993 F.3d 81 (2d. Cir. 2021); City of Oakland v. BP PLC, 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020).
87. The section states as follows:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable
on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State court from
which it was removed pursuant to section 1442 or 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.

28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
88. BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (2021).
89. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
90. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore, 952 F.3d at 458, vacated, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (2021).
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federal officer removal. 91 Oil companies argued that circuit courts should be
allowed to review any and all bases for removal, 92 because if a court finds that
even one is viable, the case can be “labeled” a federal public nuisance claim
and dismissed under American Electric Power. 93 Writing for the majority, Justice Gorsuch interpreted § 1447(d) to provide circuit courts broad authority
to review all bases for removal so long as a defendant raises federal officer removal as one of their theories. 94
In addition to the appellate review of remand orders available under
§ 1447(d), two circuit courts have reviewed appeals from a district court’s order granting removal and ultimately dismissal. The Second Circuit affirmed a
decision to dismiss in City of New York v. Chevron Corp., 95 and the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded an order of dismissal in City of Oakland v. BP
PLC, sending the case back to state court to proceed if the district court could
not find an alternative basis for jurisdiction. 96 Many climate nuisance suits are
now pending before circuit courts—newly freed up to consider all bases for
removal on appeal. 97 Next, these circuit courts will consider the merits of the

91. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. at 1537.
92. See Brief for the Petitioners at 11–15, Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. 1532 (No. 191189).
93. See supra notes 81–85 and accompanying text.
94. Mayor of Baltimore, 141 S. Ct. at 1538, 1543.
95. 993 F.3d 81, 86 (2d. Cir. 2021).
96. 960 F.3d 570, 575, 585 (9th Cir. 2020).
97. The most recent filings in several decisions are briefs concerning the merits of all bases
of removal, which federal appellate courts can review under § 1447(d) in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Baltimore. See Amended Supplemental Briefing Order, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 19-1644 (4th Cir. July 26, 2021); Appellants’ Opening Brief, City of
Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 21-15313 (9th Cir. July 19, 2021); Supplemental Brief of Appellants,
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Boulder Cnty. v. Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., 965 F.3d 792 (10th Cir.
2021) (No. 19-1330); Appellants’ Principal Supplemental Brief, Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods.
Co., No. 19-1818 (1st Cir. July 28, 2021); Order, Cnty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., No. 1815499 (9th Cir. July 1, 2021) (denying a motion for supplemental briefing and oral argument);
Joint Case Management Statement, City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No. 17-cv-06011 (N.D. Cal.
July 9, 2021) (stating that a remand to state court will be stayed until the Ninth Circuit issues a
decision in the companion case, San Mateo v. Chevron). In addition to cases that are being reviewed at the circuit court level, there are a handful of decisions in disagreement as to whether
federal district courts should remand these cases back to state court. E.g., Plaintiff’s Notice of
Supplemental Authority and Response to Defendants’ Notice, City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 20-cv-14243 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2021). In some, the court has decided to stay the proceedings
pending the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Baltimore on the merits of all bases of removal. See
Motion to Remand to State Court, Anne Arundel Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 21-cv-01323 (D. Md.
June 28, 2021); City of Annapolis v. BP P.L.C., No. ELH-21-722, 2021 WL 2000469 (D. Md. May
19, 2021) (granting a stay of proceedings pending the Fourth Circuit decision in the Baltimore
case); Text Order, City of Charleston v. Brabham Oil Co., No. 20-CV-3579 (D.S.C. May 27, 2021)
(granting a stay of proceedings pending the Fourth Circuit decision in the Baltimore case); Plaintiff’s Notice of Supplemental Authority, Delaware v. BP Am. Inc., No. 20-cv-01429 (D. Del. June
4, 2021); Order, Cnty. of Maui v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 21-15318 (9th Cir. May 11, 2021)
(granting a joint motion to extend the time to file opening briefs); Order Granting Parties’ Stip-
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theories of removal and determine if the cases should be dismissed as displaced federal public nuisance claims or remanded to state court.
The procedural moves made thus far in climate nuisance suits, while doctrinally complex, serve one simple purpose: avoiding tort liability for climate
change. Outside of climate nuisance litigation, the same oil companies named
as defendants have used their political (and actual) capital to attempt to legislate climate nuisance suits out of existence. In recent years, oil companies have
backed the efforts of lobbyists encouraging Congress to pass a simple carbon
tax program that would set a flat price per ton of carbon emitted. 98 Some of
these plans come with a major catch: in exchange for participation in a carbon
tax, these companies would be insulated from all tort liability for the harm of
climate change. 99 The proposal would phase out “[m]uch of the EPA’s regulatory authority over carbon dioxide emissions” and would bring a definitive
“end to federal and state tort liability for emitters.” 100 A flat fee for pollution
would replace all the complexities of federal legislation and common law suits.
The procedural defenses raised in climate nuisance suits seek the same end:
avoidance of a decision on the merits as to whether the sale and production of
fossil fuels have interfered with the public’s use and enjoyment of the land.
Bringing public nuisance lawsuits against oil companies has been an arduous, time-consuming, and expensive endeavor. And after years of litigation,
no plaintiff has actually succeeded on an underlying claim of public nuisance.
To be fair, the lack of success is a direct result of the procedural defenses
raised. The complexities of these defenses have kept courts from reaching the
merits, allowing companies to insulate themselves from tort liability. Still, in
the fight to hold polluters accountable, are climate nuisance suits really worth
the trouble? To aid in answering this question, Part II presents a historical
analysis of the smoke abatement movement to highlight the integral role that
nuisance served in abating smoke and provide a window into the independent
value public nuisance suits can have in the abatement of environmental harm.

ulated Motion Regarding Deadlines and Page Limits for Briefing of Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, King Cnty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 18-cv-00758 (W.D. Wash. July 7, 2021) (resuming proceedings in a case that had been stayed until the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Baltimoreadjacent case City of Oakland v. BP PLC); Joint Response to Court’s Notice and Request to Vacate Case Management Conference, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron
Corp., No. 18-cv-07477 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2020).
98. Lee Wasserman & David Kaiser, Opinion, Beware of Oil Companies Bearing Gifts,
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/opinion/carbon-tax-lottbreaux.html [perma.cc/8W8E-DLS7]; Trent Lott & John Breaux, Opinion, Here’s How to Break
the Impasse on Climate, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/climate-change-fee-carbon-dioxide.html [perma.cc/HYA5-U4JK].
99. Wasserman & Kaiser, supra note 98.
100. JAMES A. BAKER, III ET AL., CLIMATE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, THE CONSERVATIVE
CASE FOR CARBON DIVIDENDS (2017), https://www.clcouncil.org/media/2017/03/The-Conservative-Case-for-Carbon-Dividends.pdf [perma.cc/XD8D-G6X5].
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WHERE WE WERE: USING NUISANCE SUITS TO CHALLENGE THE SMOKE
EVIL IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, clouds of dense,
black smoke filled the air in industrialized cities across the United States as the
rapid and unregulated growth of the Industrial Revolution transformed the
environment. 101 Coal smoke from factories and power plants blanketed cities;
in 1906, the Pittsburgh Press observed that an American flag hanging on a
prominent town square had turned completely black. 102 Eventually, however,
American cities successfully abated the “smoke evil.” 103 While a number of
factors aided abatement, one such factor was the regulation of polluters
through court actions and local administrations. 104 This regulation encouraged industry to move away from bituminous coal to cleaner natural gas, diesel fuel, and electricity, and to embrace inventions that allowed for more
efficient combustion. 105
The purpose of this Part is to analyze the integral role smoke nuisance
suits played in abating smoke pollution to demonstrate how the climate nuisance suits of today may play a similar role in the future abatement of greenhouse gas emissions. 106 Section II.A traces the development of judicial
decisionmaking over the course of sixty years of smoke nuisance suits. Section
II.B uses Pittsburgh’s smoke abatement movement to show how common law
and legislative regulation can work in tandem to reduce environmental harm.
Section II.C highlights how nuisance lawsuits promoted innovation.
A. The Progression of Judicial Thinking in Nuisance Law, 1840–1906
The Industrial Revolution brought new forms of industry to nineteenthcentury America, such as coal-powered factories and mills, and with the Revolution came new forms of air pollution. To hold factories accountable for
pollution, plaintiffs turned to the courts, bringing public and private nuisance
suits and arguing that smoke interfered with their use and enjoyment of the
land. Originally, these suits failed. But over the course of fifty years, the common law changed rapidly to address this new environmental harm: smoke.
In general, nineteenth-century courts were not unfriendly to nuisance
claims. As industrial facilities like slaughterhouses and bone-boiling factories
pushed closer to residential neighborhoods in the mid-nineteenth century,

101. See R. Dale Grinder, The Battle for Clean Air: The Smoke Problem in Post–Civil War
America, in POLLUTION AND REFORM IN AMERICAN CITIES, 1870–1930, at 83, 83 (Martin V.
Melosi ed., 1980) [hereinafter Battle for Clean Air].
102. Smoke Has No Respect for American Flag, PITT. PRESS, June 29, 1906, at 12.
103. See, e.g., The Smoke Evil, 205 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1116 (1931).
104. See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
105. Carlos Flick, The Movement for Smoke Abatement in 19th-Century Britain, 21 TECH
& CULTURE 29, 30–46 (1980).
106. See infra Part III for a discussion of the implications of the history of smoke nuisance
suits in the present day.

May 2022]

Air Pollution as Public Nuisance

1553

judges routinely held that industrial air pollution was a prima facie nuisance. 107 If plaintiffs could show the industry’s noxious air pollution and smell
interfered with the “use and enjoyment” of public land, judges readily found
in their favor. 108 Defendant companies raised several creative defenses against
the nuisance suits, but judges ignored them. 109
For instance, in Commonwealth v. Upton, the owner of a slaughterhouse
argued that he had a proscriptive right to continue his business because it had
been in operation for twenty years before new residents complained. 110 The
court disagreed, finding that because the slaughterhouse was “inconsistent”
with the preservation of “the welfare and safety of the community,” it must
yield. 111 Public nuisance suits like Upton functioned as the common law counterpart to state police power; 112 so long as an action served to protect the health
and safety of the public, judges upheld the challenges. 113
In old industry pollution suits, judges often rejected defendants’ arguments against causation and harm, even if it meant enjoining a long-standing
factory from production. 114 In Commonwealth v. Van Sickle, for instance, the
owner of an offensive-smelling “piggery” argued in part that there was no causation because the noxious smell could be coming from other piggeries in the
neighborhood. The court found that the piggery was a nuisance, rejecting the
argument that plaintiffs must attribute the nuisance to a single, particularized
defendant to prevail. 115 Finally, in Howard v. Lee, when a defendant argued
that the plaintiffs had only proven discomfort from the smell of his slaughterhouse, not a threat to public health or welfare, the court still found for the
plaintiffs, reasoning that discomfort alone constituted a nuisance. 116 In these

107. Christine Rosen, Differing Perceptions of the Value of Pollution Abatement Across
Time and Place: Balancing Doctrine in Pollution Nuisance Law, 1840–1906, 11 L. & HIST. REV.
303, 312–14 (1993) [hereinafter Rosen, Differing Perceptions].
108. See, e.g., Catlin v. Valentine, 9 Paige Ch. 575 (N.Y. Ch. 1842); Commonwealth v. Van
Sickle, 1 Brightly 69 (Pa. 1845); Commonwealth v. Upton, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 473 (1856); Brady
v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1848); Howard v. Lee, 5 N.Y. Super. Ct. 281 (1849); Smith
v. Cummings, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. 92 (Pa. C.P. 1851).
109. Christine Meisner Rosen, ‘Knowing’ Industrial Pollution: Nuisance Law and the Power
of Tradition in a Time of Rapid Economic Change, 1840–1864, 8 ENV’T. HIST. 565, 585, 596 (2003)
[hereinafter Rosen, ‘Knowing’ Industrial Pollution].
110. Upton, 72 Mass. at 474.
111. Id. at 476.
112. See ERNST FREUND, STANDARDS OF AMERICAN LEGISLATION 66 (1917) (“Theoretically, it might be said, the law of nuisance is the common law of the police power, striking at all
gross violations of health, safety, order, and morals.”).
113. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE 217–218 (1996).
114. In general, a nuisance claim requires proving interference with one’s use and enjoyment of the land, which necessarily requires showing that a particular defendant caused the interference and that the interference was actually harmful. Causation and harm are both elements
that a modern-day plaintiff must prove in a climate nuisance suit, too. For more on the requirements of a prima facie climate nuisance suit, see infra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
115. Commonwealth v. Van Sickle, 1 Brightly 69, 71, 73–75 (Pa. 1845).
116. Howard v. Lee, 5 N.Y. Super. Ct. 281, 282–83 (1849).
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old industry cases, judges embraced a capacious understanding of nuisance
law, capable of protecting public welfare.
Yet, during the same time period, when plaintiffs brought nuisance suits
against “new industry” pollution from mills, mines, and smelters, they did not
win so easily. 117 Judges embraced similar defenses raised by slaughterhouses
(and written off by courts) to dismiss nuisance claims. 118 For example, in Warren v. Hunter, a plaintiff attempted to sue a paper mill for smoke nuisance.
The mill won the suit by claiming a proscriptive right to continue its business,
the same defense that failed in Upton. 119 And in Tichenor v. Wilson, a plaintiff
claimed that a new chemical works company producing vapors constituted a
nuisance. The court required the plaintiff to show irreparable injury, not just
discomfort. 120 But when the slaughterhouse in Howard raised the same argument, the court dismissed it. 121
Historian Christine M. Rosen attributes the stark contrast between nuisance suits brought against old industries (slaughterhouses) and new industries (mills and factories) to a lack of judicial understanding about new forms
of pollution. 122 Judges lacked on-point precedent to apply in new industry pollution suits and approached testimony about new forms of pollution with confusion—as scientific understanding about the impact of smoke on health and
the environment had only just started to develop. 123 In contrast, slaughterhouses “were deeply rooted in American life,” and had been regulated through
nuisance law since colonial times. 124 While the judicial schema for “nuisance”
did not immediately catch up to the reality of air pollution from new industries, judicial attitudes changed over the next fifty years, shaping the scope of
what constituted a nuisance at common law.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, judges began to apply a rudimentary balancing doctrine to nuisance suits against new industry, attempting to reconcile harm to the environment with the benefit of an industrialized
economy. 125 In these cases, judges did not reach the most economically efficient allocation each time; in reality, the reasoning often sprung from flawed
logic. 126 Some judges attributed enormous social costs to granting an injunction against a single coal-powered factory, reasoning that it would cause a

117. Rosen, ‘Knowing’ Industrial Pollution, supra note 109, at 573.
118. Id.
119. Warren v. Hunter, 10 Phila. 414, 417 (Pa. C.P. 1853); see supra notes 110–112 and
accompanying text.
120. Tichenor v. Wilson, 4 N.J. Eq. 197, 204–05 (N.J. Ch. 1849).
121. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
122. Rosen, ‘Knowing’ Industrial Pollution, supra note 109, at 587–88.
123. See id. at 577, 588.
124. Id. at 568–69.
125. Rosen, Differing Perceptions, supra note 107, at 303–04.
126. Id. at 315.
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domino effect and terminate all industry across a state. 127 Other judges underestimated the cost of granting an injunction, failing to consider the social costs
of shutting down a factory, like job loss. 128 Courts also displayed an uneven
understanding of an injunction’s benefits. Some courts viewed injunctions as
highly beneficial because they believed pollution caused serious emotional
harm to the community, while others characterized injunctions as unnecessary because pollution only caused minor human discomfort. 129 When confronted with the question of how best to allocate the costs and benefits of new
industry, judges experimented, crafting an imperfect balance between these
competing interests.
At the turn of the twentieth century, courts in Pennsylvania and New
York, two states particularly affected by the problem of smoke pollution at the
time, made an abrupt shift away from balancing cost and benefit to adopting
a standard of prima facie nuisance for smoke pollution. 130 In 1913, for example, the New York Court of Appeals stated that when considering industrial
pollution, “a balancing of injuries cannot be justified” because of its tendency
to cause injustice. 131 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, holding that no
court ought to “refuse to protect a man in the possession and enjoyment of his
property” even when it may destroy industry. 132
According to Rosen, the shift from dismissing smoke nuisance suits to
embracing them resulted from three main factors: the growing costs of pollution, a shift in public opinion, and the development of abatement technology. 133 The turn of the century saw a political shift toward progressive reform,
with an emphasis on improving cities, that may have influenced the courts. 134
And, around the same time, technological advances meant factories had devices they could install to abate smoke without having to relocate or shut down
operations entirely, minimizing the cost of injunctions. 135 But these two shifts

127. Id. at 318; see e.g., Robb v. Carnegie Bros., 22 A. 649, 651 (Pa. 1891).
128. See, e.g., Campbell v. Seaman, 63 N.Y. 568, 577, 586–87 (1876); Rosen, Differing Perceptions, supra note 107, at 326.
129. More specifically, Professor Rosen draws a comparison between the different states
where smoke pollution was a big problem in the nineteenth century. In Pennsylvania, judges
tended to overemphasize the costs of an injunction to industry while downplaying the benefit to
the community, whereas in New York and New Jersey, judges tended to overemphasize the benefit of an injunction for the community, downplaying the cost to industry. Rosen, Differing Perceptions, supra note 107, at 327–42.
130. Id. at 367.
131. Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805, 805–06 (N.Y. 1913) (emphasis
added).
132. Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065, 1071 (Pa. 1904) (quoting Evans v.
Reading Chem. & Fertilizing Co., 28 A. 702, 709 (Pa. 1894)). Pennsylvania’s adoption of a proplaintiff stance is particularly noteworthy, as it was a politically conservative state where coalpowered industry dominated its economy. Rosen, Differing Perceptions, supra note 107, at 369.
133. Rosen, Differing Perceptions, supra note 107, at 369.
134. Id. at 375.
135. Id. at 371–73.
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did not happen in a vacuum; the nuisance suits themselves directly motivated
an increased emphasis on smoke abatement in politics and spurred the development of smoke abatement technologies.
B. “Cleaning Up Pittsburgh for All of Us”: Regulation of Smoke in Pittsburgh,
1804–1913
During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, residents of industrial cities like Pittsburgh attacked the problem of the smoke evil from multiple angles: bringing nuisance lawsuits, forming organizations, and lobbying for local
and state legislation. This Section uses Pittsburgh’s smoke abatement movement as a case study to show how smoke nuisance suits worked in tandem
with other forms of regulation to abate environmental harm. 136
In 1804, the burgess of Pittsburgh, General Presley Neville, wrote a letter
to the president of the Pittsburgh city council about the problem of smoke in
the city, stating that “not only the comfort [and] health . . . but the peace and
harmony of the inhabitants, depend upon the speedy measures being adopted
to remedy the nuisance.” 137 Situated near bituminous coal mines, Pittsburgh
was especially prone to smoke problems. 138 Although city leadership identified the problem early on, over sixty years later, in 1868, Pittsburgh only had
one ordinance on the books to regulate coal consumption, and it only applied
to trains. 139 In the time before local legislation restricted smoke, common law
suits began to craft a standard for what constituted a nuisance, balancing the
interests of the economy and citizens. 140
For example, in 1868, in Rhodes v. Dunbar, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania considered whether a planing mill producing smoke, soot, and flammable wood shavings constituted a nuisance. 141 The court ultimately
dismissed the complaint, finding no nuisance worthy of an injunction by balancing the benefit and harm of the planing mill. 142 The court reasoned first
that the harm was just “[a]nnoyance[] without damage.” 143 While it noted that
planing mills could burn different kinds of fuel and that some dirtier forms of

136. Of course, these tools did not exist in a vacuum. The correlation between nuisance,
local legislation, and abatement should not be overstated, as the abatement of smoke happened
in a complex economic, political, and cultural context.
137. John O’Connor, Jr., Some Engineering Phases of Pittsburgh’s Smoke Problem, SMOKE
INVESTIGATION OF THE MELLON INST., BULL. 8, 1914, at 11–12.
138. Battle for Clean Air, supra note 101, at 84.
139. Cliff I. Davidson, Air Pollution in Pittsburgh: A Historical Perspective, 29 J. AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 1035, 1037 (1979); O’Connor, Jr., supra note 137, at 12 (“No bituminous coal or wood shall be used in the engine [of] any locomotive employed in conducting
trains upon any railroad.”).
140. See NOVAK, supra note 113, at 221; see also, e.g., Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Pa. 274 (1868);
Huckenstine’s Appeal, 70 Pa. 102 (1871).
141. 57 Pa. at 274–75.
142. Id. at 287.
143. Id. at 286–87.
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fuel might constitute a nuisance, the court was unwilling to hold all planing
mills a nuisance per se. 144 Ultimately, it concluded that it would be unfair to
deprive the factory owner of “its free and profitable use” just because “the light
and air may not be as pure as a neighbor might desire.” 145 In reasoning
through the balance of harm and benefit, the court began to define the contours of how much smoke—and what kind of smoke—constituted a nuisance.
Beginning in 1880, Pittsburgh residents began to rally more forcefully
around the smoke evil, lobbying for their city council to address the problem. 146 The local Engineers’ Society started circulating papers on the smoke
problem, which inspired the city council to pass an ordinance to control
smoke in the East End of the city. 147 But the ordinance still left the city’s industrial sector unregulated, reflecting the city council’s ties to special industrial interests. 148 Groups like the Ladies’ Health Association and Civic Club
pushed back, asking the city council to pass an ordinance with more teeth. 149
At the same time, citizens continued to bring nuisance lawsuits against smoke
emitters in Pennsylvania state courts, pushing both the local government and
the courts to define what constituted a tolerable—and legal—level of smoke. 150
As the Pennsylvania courts adopted smoke as a prima facie nuisance, 151
the local government also became more amenable to protecting the public
from air pollution. In 1906, Pittsburgh passed the Weber Bill, which created a
Bureau of Smoke Regulation. 152 The Bill also drew on earlier Pennsylvania
cases, balancing the harm and benefit of industry to define the level of smoke
that constituted a nuisance in the city as the release of “black or dense gray
smoke” for more than eight minutes at a time. 153

144. Id. at 286–88.
145. Id. at 287–88.
146. Robert Dale Grinder, From Insurgency to Efficiency: The Smoke Abatement Campaign
in Pittsburgh Before World War I, 61 W. PA. HIST. MAG. 187 (1978) [hereinafter From Insurgency
to Efficiency]; Battle for Clean Air, supra note 101.
147. From Insurgency to Efficiency, supra note 146, at 188–89; O’Connor, Jr., supra note
137, at 15 (“[The ordinance] provided that after September 1, 1892, it should be unlawful for any
chimney or smoke stack used in connection with a stationary boiler to allow, suffer or permit
smoke from bituminous coal to be emitted or escape therefrom, within a certain district.”).
148. From Insurgency to Efficiency, supra note 146, at 189.
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., Straus v. Barnett, 21 A. 253 (Pa. 1891); Robb v. Carnegie Bros., 22 A. 649 (Pa.
1891); Daugherty Typewriter Co. v. Kittanning Iron & Steel Mfg. Co., 35 A. 1111 (Pa. 1896);
Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 57 A. 1065 (Pa. 1904).
151. See supra Section II.A.
152. From Insurgency to Efficiency, supra note 146, at 192, 199.
153. O’Connor, Jr., supra note 137, at 17; From Insurgency to Efficiency, supra note 146, at
192. After the Weber Bill passed, it was challenged in court and initially struck down by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court as overstepping the city’s legal authority. Commonwealth v. Standard Ice Co., 9 Justices’ L. Rep. 270, 270–73 (Pa. 1910). The Pennsylvania State Legislature sprang
into action, passing a bill the same year as the ruling to grant cities the affirmative power to
regulate the emission of smoke. O’Connor, Jr., supra note 137, at 18.
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The story of smoke abatement in Pittsburgh shows that common law is
not the antithesis of legislation. On the contrary, both nuisance law and local
ordinances served as regulatory tools that informed one another in an era of
“exponentially problematic” pollution. 154 The nuisance lawsuits served as
“precedents and rationales for the more extensive legislative and municipal
efforts to regulate industrial trades.” 155 By allowing judges to set acceptable
levels in individual cases, nuisance suits became tools to balance competing
societal values and served as templates for future legislation.
C. Eventual Innovation
Ultimately, cities like Pittsburgh did not solve the smoke evil by regulating
factories out of existence. The culmination of the smoke abatement movement
was a series of technological breakthroughs. Industry shifted to using “natural
gas, diesel fuel, and electricity,” which cleared the air of black smoke. 156 New
inventions allowed factories to burn coal more efficiently, reducing the
amount of smoke emitted during combustion. 157 But these innovations did
not appear out of thin air; they were the direct result of the pressure placed on
polluting industries, including the pressure from nuisance suits and local legislation restricting the ability to pollute with impunity.
Regulatory tools, both common law and legislative, can motivate industry
innovation. 158 In his work on technological advancements in the smoke abatement movement, historian Ben Pontin describes the first stage on the path to
technological innovation as the generation of a “common law prototype.” 159
In the context of individual cases where the stakes are not yet industry wide,
individual actors can work creatively to tackle environmental harms. For instance, in David v. Vivian—a British nuisance suit against a polluting smelting

154. NOVAK, supra note 113, at 217–18.
155. Id. at 221.
156. Battle for Clean Air, supra note 101, at 100.
157. Flick, supra note 105, at 39–46. Smoke was a byproduct of the inefficient burning of
coal. To combat the problem, there were three main categories of technological innovations during the nineteenth century. First, there were devices that “introduced air directly into the hot
‘carburetted hydrogen’ gases . . . and ‘smoke’ . . . in the furnace” to burn them off. Id. at 39. Early
prototype examples included Josiah Parke’s “split bridge” furnace, patented in 1820, and Charles
Wye William’s “argand furnace,” patented in 1839. Id. at 40. Second, there were inventions that
“prevent[ed] smoke” through “a continuous supply of hot coals sufficient to burn the impurities
given off by fresh fuel.” Id. at 43. An early prototype example of the technology was John Juckes’s
longitudinal and circular moving grates, patented in 1841 and 1842. Lastly, improved construction of flues was utilized to “trap or wash out impurities discharged by furnaces.” Id. at 43–44.
These devices had a rocky start. For example, an early prototype invented by Thomas Hedley in
1842 was only used by a few small businesses. Id. at 44, 46.
158. Ben Pontin, Nuisance Law, Regulation, and the Invention of Prototypical Pollution
Abatement Technology: ‘Voluntarism’ in Common Law and Regulation, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 1253, 1253–54 (Roger Brownsword,
Eloise Scotford & Karen Yeung eds., 2017) [hereinafter Voluntarism].
159. Id.
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facility—the jury found for the defendant, John Henry Vivian, but only after
he invested tens of thousands of pounds in budding technology from investors
Michael Faraday and Richard Phillips to invent better flue-gas treatment for
copper-smelting emissions. 160 Of course, not all environmental nuisance suits
led to a direct investment in abatement technology. But implicit in all damage
awards and injunctions is economic pressure on industry, which can incentivize innovation.
In other areas of nineteenth-century nuisance law, the same pattern of
prototyping technology played out in practice. For instance, during Britain’s
Industrial Revolution, a number of individual plaintiffs brought nuisance actions against sewage companies, whose rudimentary disposal techniques
caused terrible noxious smells. 161 In a single nuisance action against the Birmingham Corporation in London, an injunction led to the investment of a
half a million pounds in clean infrastructure technology. 162 The lawsuit was
one of many at the time against sewage companies, leading to other comparable investments in abatement technologies. 163 Eventually, companies began to
adopt cleaner sewage-processing technologies merely from the threat of potential nuisance litigation. 164
After common law claims generate an abatement prototype, regulation
through legislation can render the prototype into the eventual archetype, replicated on an industry-wide scale. 165 Both common law and legislation therefore serve distinct purposes in the adoption of technological advancements,
the former “pushing the frontiers of what was technological[ly] possible, thus
giving politicians a clean technology prototype,” and the latter allowing a government to generalize a novel technology. 166 The interplay between nuisance
and legislation had a positive impact on pollution abatement a hundred years
ago. The purpose of Part III of this Comment is to explore how the success of
the past smoke abatement compares to our current efforts at greenhouse gas
abatement.

160. Ben Pontin, The Common Law Clean Up of the ‘Workshop of the World’: More Realism
About Nuisance Law’s Historic Environmental Achievements, 40 J.L. & SOC’Y 173, 191, 192 (2013)
[hereinafter Common Law Clean Up]; Ronald Rees, The Great Copper Trials, HIST. TODAY, Dec.
1993, at 38, 39.
161. Common Law Clean Up, supra note 160, at 193–94.
162. Id. at 194.
163. Id. at 194–95.
164. Id. at 195 (“South, towards the midlands, the towns of Banbury, Coventry, Leamington Spa, Rugby, and Warwick were all purifying sewage within the framework of the threat of
actions from owners of neighbouring rural estates.”).
165. Voluntarism, supra note 158, at 1254.
166. Common Law Clean Up, supra note 160, at 193.
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III. WHERE WE ARE HEADED: THE VALUE OF PUBLIC NUISANCE IN
GREENHOUSE GAS ABATEMENT
Currently, the future of climate nuisance suits is unclear. Since the recent
decision in BP P.L.C. v. Mayor of Baltimore, most of these suits are proceeding
through an appellate review of the many bases for removal to federal court. 167
In the wake of these decisions, some will likely head back to state court where
a decision on the merits could be imminent. 168
Critics often claim that these lawsuits, bound up in a web of complicated
procedural defenses about the jurisdiction of federal courts, and touching on
complex climate science, are an “unprecedented” and improper use of public
nuisance to solve an environmental problem. 169 This Part uses the history of
smoke nuisance suits to demonstrate the potential value of climate nuisance
suits in the modern greenhouse gas abatement movement. Section III.A draws
a comparison between the earliest smoke nuisance suits and the current climate nuisance suits to show how nuisance law may develop over time to allow
plaintiffs to recover on the merits. Section III.B explores the beneficial role
climate nuisance suits can play in the modern regulatory state. Section III.C
considers the expressive and innovative value of climate nuisance suits.
A. Early Climate Nuisance Suits, Early Smoke Nuisance Suits, and Reaching
a Decision on the Merits
The main goal in bringing climate nuisance suits is to hold oil companies
economically responsible for the damage of climate change. Of course, plaintiffs must actually be able to win the suits to meet this goal. Thus far, the procedural chess match in climate nuisance suits has kept judges from the
merits, 170 so any analysis about the viability of a decision on the underlying
nuisance claim is necessarily speculative. However, the history of nuisance
law’s development over time in the smoke abatement movement provides a
window into how plaintiffs may find eventual success.
Despite the complexity of the procedural defenses raised in climate nuisance suits, the underlying claim of public nuisance is quite straightforward:
it shifts responsibility for the harm of climate change from a municipality onto
the companies that have profited off of fossil fuels. As Chief Judge William E.
Smith in the District of Rhode Island put it, “[c]limate change is expensive,
and the State wants help paying for it.” 171 But in order to win on the merits
and receive compensation for the damage done by climate change, a plaintiff
167. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
168. Of course, realistically, it’s likely that climate nuisance defendants will raise a procedural argument that while suits are not federal common law displaced by the CAA, the state
common law claims are preempted by the CAA. For more information on preemption, see Section I.C infra.
169. See, e.g., supra note 23.
170. See supra Section I.D.
171. Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142, 146 (D.R.I. 2019).
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would need to prove (1) the sale and production of fossil fuels caused (2) unreasonable interference (3) with the public’s use and enjoyment of public
land. 172
First, a hypothetical suit would require proof of the harm of climate
change in a particular location 173 and proof that fossil fuels contribute to the
warming of our planet, a fact that judges appear amenable to accept as conclusive. 174 Next, a suit would require the court to determine whether the interference is “unreasonable,” which necessitates balancing the “social utility
against the gravity of the anticipated harm.” 175 This is no easy task; as Judge
Alsup—a federal judge in California—recently opined, “our industrial revolution and the development of our modern world has literally been fueled by oil
and coal.” 176 Thus, while the harm of carbon dioxide is clear, fossil fuels have
also benefited society. Finally, a suit would require proving causation, a point
that defendants frequently press: is it really fair to hold individual companies
liable for a diffuse warming caused by every consumer on our planet? 177
While judges have not yet reached the merits of climate nuisance suits,
judges did reach the merits of smoke nuisance suits, which required identical
proofs. As discussed in Section II.A, the story of smoke nuisance suits fell into
three tidy phases: first, judges refused to hold defendant factories liable for
smoke nuisance for a range of technical reasons. 178 Next, judges began to apply
a rudimentary balancing test, weighing the harm of smoke against the benefit
of industry. 179 Finally, judges found smoke to be a prima facie nuisance. 180 The
entire evolution of doctrine took about sixty years, beginning in the 1840s and
ending in the early 1900s.
The recent wave of climate nuisance suits began in earnest in 2004 with
American Electric Power. 181 But because of the emphasis on procedural issues, 182 the development of the substantive tort law—whether the sale and

172. Each state’s specific formulation of the elements of public nuisance differs, but these
elements are present in all of the complaints. See, e.g., Complaint paras. 154–57, City of Honolulu v. Sunoco LP, No. 1CCV-20-0000380 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2020).
173. For example, in a recent complaint filed by the city of Hoboken, the plaintiffs focus
on the damage Superstorm Sandy caused to the city. Complaint, City of Hoboken v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. HUD-L-003179-20 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 2, 2020).
174. See, e.g., City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
vacated 960 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The issue is not over science. All parties agree that fossil
fuels have led to global warming and ocean rise and will continue to do so . . . .”).
175. Id. at 1023.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Notice of Removal at 2, Pac. Coast Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. 3:18-cv-7477 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018).
178. See supra notes 117–120 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 130–132 and accompanying text.
181. Complaint, Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(No. 04 Civ. 5669).
182. See supra Section I.D.
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production of fossil fuels constitute a public nuisance—is still in its infancy.
In the rare instances when judges in these early climate nuisance suits have
opined on the merits, their reasoning reveals anxieties reminiscent of the early
smoke nuisance opinions.
In 1855, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled against a plaintiff who
alleged that the construction of a train platform by the Ohio and Pennsylvania
Railroad Company created a public nuisance by emitting black coal smoke
into the air. 183 The court expressed concern that a victory for the plaintiff
would set a dangerous precedent for Pennsylvania’s growing economy. 184 If
the court could enjoin the Ohio and Pennsylvania Railroad Company, then
other courts could potentially “stop all machinery of every description, driven
or propelled by steam [as well as] stop all public markets which produce noise
and disturb the citizens residing adjacent thereto, and restrain the use of coal,
as fuel, because of the intolerable annoyance occasioned by its smoke.” 185 The
court, and many other courts of the era, could not imagine finding for a
smoke-nuisance plaintiff without crippling industry nationwide.
In 2009, the Northern District of California grappled with a similar concern in the climate nuisance suit, Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil
Corp. 186 Holding Exxon responsible for the increasing levels of greenhouse
gases in our atmosphere could potentially cripple our energy sector. The court
worried there was no guidance as to “precisely what judicially discoverable
and manageable standards are to be employed” by courts to decide how to
hold companies responsible without restricting the entire economy to an unreasonable degree. 187
The cases reveal two similar anxieties: what law to apply and where to
draw the line. In the mid-nineteenth century, one reason judges hesitated to
find for plaintiffs in smoke nuisance suits was the lack of on-point precedent
to apply. 188 The same problem exists today: while climate nuisance suits have
been pending before state and federal courts for years, no court has had an
opportunity to reach the merits and generate clear precedent. Further, the lack

183. See Bell v. Ohio & Pa. R.R. Co., 25 Pa. 161 (1855).
184. See id. at 176.
185. Id.
186. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The case was dismissed before the court could
reach the merits because the plaintiffs had brought a federal common law public nuisance claim,
which the court held was displaced under the recently announced precedent from the Supreme
Court in American Electric Power. Id. at 883; see supra Section I.B.
187. Native Vill. of Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
188. According to Professor Rosen:
The courts had a tradition that dated back to the late Middle Ages in England of treating
slaughterhouses, bone-boiling establishments and the like as per se or prima facie presumptive nuisances. They had virtually no experience, however, dealing with the pollution emitted by the large water and steam powered factories, textile mills, and other
industries that the industrial revolution brought to the fore. The lack of precedent had a
major impact on the way some judges and juries adjudicated such cases.

See Rosen, ‘Knowing’ Industrial Pollution, supra note 109, at 576–77.
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of awareness about the consequences of smoke pollution in the nineteenth
century mirrors our lack of collective understanding of the consequences of
climate change today. 189 Because the problem of smoke outpaced a general
awareness of the detrimental impact of pollution, judges did not understand
the stakes of smoke nuisance suits and dismissed them outright.190 Just as
nineteenth-century judges downplayed the cost of smoke pollution while
readily acknowledging the benefit of industry, judges reaching the merits in
climate nuisance suits are likely to follow suit and draw the line between cost
and benefit in favor of oil companies.
The strategy of defendants in these early climate nuisance suits also parallels the strategy of defendants in early smoke nuisance suits. By emphasizing
and relying on a series of technical, affirmative defenses, defendants—both
then and now—try to muddy the waters of the straightforward public nuisance claims to avoid liability. In the 1852 case Davidson v. Isham, a group of
plaintiffs filed a nuisance action in a court of equity against a smoke-emitting
mill. 191 The complaint alleged that plaintiffs at the edge of the neighborhood
were exposed to smoke, steam, vapors, and smells. 192 The complaint further
charged that two of the plaintiffs were exposed to the danger of an explosion
and frequent rattling. 193 The defendants argued in part that the case should be
dismissed since it had already been brought before the “proper tribunal,” a
court of law, which “found in their favor,” precluding the plaintiffs from
bringing suit in a court of equity. 194 In response, the New Jersey Court of
Chancery dismissed the suit because of a different procedural defect: the complaint improperly blended common and individual nuisance claims. 195
The ruling grew out of the doctrinal difference between nineteenth-century private nuisance and public nuisance. Individuals could bring private
nuisance claims; groups suffering a common harm could bring public nuisance claims. 196 In Davidson, the Court of Chancery noted that some of the
harm alleged, like the rattling doors, windows, mantle ornaments, and loose
articles of furniture, only affected two of the plaintiffs. 197 But the rest of the
harm, like the smoke and smell, affected the entire neighborhood. 198 The court
189. According to the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication, in 2010, only
thirty-three percent of Americans believed there was scientific consensus about climate change.
As of 2017, the percentage has increased, but only to fifty-three percent. Matthew T. Ballew et
al., Climate Change in the American Mind: Data, Tools, and Trends, ENV.: SCI. & POL’Y FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV., Apr. 2019, at 7, fig. 2, https://doi.org/10.1080/00139157.2019.1589300.
190. Rosen, ‘Knowing’ Industrial Pollution, supra note 109, at 588–89.
191. 9 N.J. Eq. 186, 187–88 (1852).
192. Davidson, 9 N.J. Eq. at 186.
193. Id. at 190.
194. Id. at 188.
195. Id. at 189–91.
196. See Paul M. Kurtz, Nineteenth Century Anti-Entrepreneurial Nuisance Injunctions—
Avoiding the Chancellor, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 639–40 (1976).
197. Davidson, 9 N.J. Eq. at 190.
198. Id.
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found that if several plaintiffs wanted to join together, “the injury or grievance
complained of must be common to all.” 199 It was improper for a group of
plaintiffs to add in more serious allegations to bolster a collective claim of nuisance if those harms weren’t suffered collectively. 200 Essentially, the court held
that the claim labeled public nuisance was actually a private nuisance claim. 201
Similar to the court’s holding in Davidson, defendant companies in climate nuisance suits contend that the state nuisance claims plaintiffs are pleading are actually federal nuisance claims. 202 Both the current procedural
strategy and the public nuisance defense strategy aim to challenge the general
rule that the plaintiff is the master of their own complaint. These strategies
urge courts to find that a complaint is masquerading as something different.
In this way, defendants complicate a simple nuisance claim in an effort to
avoid liability. Of course, history also reveals that this strategy did not last
long. Over time, plaintiffs in smoke nuisance suits were able to convince
judges to steer around these procedural technicalities and get to the merits of
the underlying claim.
And yet, despite the history of judges successfully deciding smoke nuisance suits on the merits, during relatively recent climate nuisance suits,
judges have suggested that using public nuisance to regulate greenhouse gases
is a fool’s errand because the cause of action is inappropriate, and the courts
are the wrong venue. For instance, in North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tennessee Valley Authority, Judge Wilkinson expressed skepticism toward applying
the boundless tort of public nuisance to the specific harm of air pollution, reasoning that “[i]f we are to regulate smokestack emissions by the same principles we use to regulate prostitution, obstacles in highways, and bullfights, we
will be hard pressed to derive any manageable criteria.”203 Chief Justice Roberts took the skepticism a step further in his Massachusetts v. EPA dissent,
questioning the ability of courts to address climate change at all. 204 He reasoned that since “[t]he very concept of global warming seems inconsistent”
with an individual, judicially redressable injury, courts could never provide
the relief requested. 205 The history of smoke nuisance suits shows that this
skepticism is misguided—we have derived manageable criteria, courts have
provided meaningful relief to plaintiffs experiencing harm from air pollution,
and it can happen again.
199. Id. at 190–91.
200. Id. at 191 (“The several complainants cannot unite their distinct and individual causes
of complaint, and by their combination make a case of nuisance, which separately would not
establish the complaint.”).
201. See Rosen, ‘Knowing’ Industrial Pollution, supra note 109, at 581–82 for a description
of procedural defenses in early smoke nuisance suits.
202. See supra Section I.D.
203. North Carolina ex rel. Cooper v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 615 F.3d 291, 302 (4th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted).
204. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 541 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
205. Id. Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent reasons that global warming is not specific enough
to grant the state of Massachusetts standing to sue because it lacked a particularized injury. Id.
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If climate nuisance suits continue to parallel the development of smoke
nuisance suits, the lesson to draw from this historical parallel is tentatively
hopeful. Like the plaintiffs in early smoke nuisance suits, the plaintiffs in the
first wave of hypothetical merits decisions might not win. But eventually, the
suits themselves can help reorient judicial understanding of what constitutes
nuisance, and plaintiffs could see longer-term success. The history of smoke
nuisance suits reveals that the suits themselves contributed to a shift in collective understanding about what constituted a nuisance under the common law,
which helped plaintiffs win nuisance suits. The same could happen with climate nuisance suits. Even the oil companies seem to be worried about this
possibility, considering their choice to lobby for complete insulation from tort
liability in exchange for participation in a carbon tax program. 206 So long as
plaintiffs continue to bring climate nuisance suits, the suits themselves will
help change judicial minds about the underlying viability of the claim. 207
B. Two Sources of Regulation: Legislation and the Common Law
Beyond allowing plaintiffs to hold oil companies liable for the harm of
climate change, climate nuisance suits could put pressure on the EPA to craft
stricter standards for greenhouse gas emissions under the CAA by shifting our
collective schema for the appropriate level of pollution. The biggest difference
between the smoke abatement movement and the greenhouse gas abatement
movement is the extent of federal regulation in place today. In the nineteenthcentury smoke abatement movement, regulation moved from common law,
to local legislation, to a comprehensive administrative regime. 208 In contrast,
the present legal system is more of a “tapestry,” with “strands of legislative
enactments, administrative regulations, and the common law” woven together. 209 Despite these differences, just as nuisance law worked in tandem
with legislation then, it can do so again today.
As discussed in Section II.B, the city of Pittsburgh eventually regulated its
smoke problem through the Weber Bill, a piece of local legislation that set the
precise amount of smoke pollution that constituted a nuisance. 210 Earlier nuisance suits played the role of prototyping the appropriate level of smoke by
balancing between the economic benefit of industry and the environmental

206. Umair Irfan, Exxon Is Lobbying for a Carbon Tax. There Is, Obviously, a Catch., VOX
(Oct. 18, 2018, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/18/17983866/climate-change-exxoncarbon-tax-lawsuit [perma.cc/9HLP-EEKZ].
207. Of course, plaintiffs’ ability to bring climate nuisance suits depends on whether the
CAA preempts them. As discussed supra in Section I.C, most courts that have ruled on the issue
of whether the CAA preempts state tort law have found against preemption. But arguing for
preemption is still likely to be the next procedural move made by oil companies, and it is possible
that courts hearing the issue for the first time might agree with the Fourth Circuit’s view.
208. See NOVAK, supra note 113, at 218–21.
209. Faulk & Gray, supra note 19, at 511.
210. See supra notes 152–153 and accompanying text.
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harm of smoke in the context of individual suits rather than city-wide. 211
Thus, nuisance law served as a critical tool for Pittsburgh residents pushing
for more regulation of industry.
On the most basic level, the issue in both a climate nuisance suit and
smoke nuisance suit is a tension between two competing entitlements: the entitlement to clean air and the entitlement to pollute. 212 The existence of a high
volume of litigation challenging air pollution suggests that the sources of regulation currently in place, be they common law or legislative, are not striking
the balance between these entitlements desired by society. Today, two sources
of litigation, climate nuisance suits and CAA citizen suits, suggest that greenhouse gas pollution levels permitted under the CAA are not set at the ideal
level.
The CAA contains a statutory provision known as the “citizens suit” provision that allows individuals to bring petitions to review EPA actions. 213 Since
the beginning of 2020 alone, at least ten major actions under this provision
have already been brought against the EPA, challenging the standards promulgated for the regulation of greenhouse gases. 214 While the specific allegations
differ, the petitions are unified in alleging that the EPA is failing to meet its
statutory obligation to regulate air pollution—similar to the claim in Massachusetts v. EPA. 215 These lawsuits, coupled with the influx of climate nuisance
suits, suggest that the current regulation of greenhouse gases has not set the
appropriate balance between the competing entitlements to pollute and to enjoy clean air.
Where entitlements are in tension, the most economically efficient course
of action is allocating the costs to the actor who can “most cheaply avoid
them.” 216 But the cheapest cost avoider in climate nuisance suits is not readily
apparent, as there are complicated societal costs on both sides, environmental
and economic, respectively. In the nineteenth century, courts began to work

211. See supra notes 140–145 and accompanying text.
212. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (1972).
213. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). The citizens suit provision of the CAA allows for review of
EPA actions in “promulgating any national primary or secondary ambient air quality standard,
any emission standard . . . , [or] any standard of performance.” Id.
214. Petition for Rev., Env’t Def. Fund v. Wheeler, No. 20-1360 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2020);
Petition for Rev., Env’t L. & Pol’y Ctr. v. Wheeler, No. 20-1364 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2020); Petition
for Rev., California v. Wheeler, No. 20-1367 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2020); Petition for Rev., Ctr. for
Bio. Diversity v. EPA, No. 21-1021 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2021); Petition for Rev., California v. EPA,
No. 21-1018 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 2021); Petition for Rev., Cal. Cmtys. Against Toxics v. EPA, No.
21-1041 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2021); Petition for Rev., New York v. EPA, No. 21-1026 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 19, 2021); Petition for Rev., California v. EPA, No. 21-1035 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 2021); Petition
for Rev., Am. Pub. Health Ass’n v. EPA, No. 21-1036 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 19, 2021); Petition for Rev.,
Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, No. 21-1063 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 12, 2021); Complaint, WildEarth Guardians
v. Colo. Dept. of Pub. Health & Env’t, No. 2021CV030213 (Colo. Dist. Ct. Feb. 16, 2021); Complaint, Env’t Integrity Project v. Wheeler, No. 21-cv-00009 (D.D.C. Jan. 4, 2021).
215. See supra notes 37–40 and accompanying text.
216. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 212, at 1096–97.
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through similarly complicated costs through smoke nuisance suits. 217 Judges
had to consider competing costs: on one hand, there was the economic cost of
closing a polluting factory, and on the other hand, there was the environmental cost of polluted air. 218
When no entitlement clearly wins out, there are two possible avenues for
judicial resolution. First, a court could look to the relative worthiness of the
two entitlements and allocate the cost accordingly. 219 Second, a court could
make a decision consistent with other entitlements in society. 220 Paradoxically, the history of smoke nuisance suits shows that the best way to resolve
the question of how to allocate the cost of pollution in a climate nuisance suit
is to continue to bring climate nuisance suits, allowing society to try and settle
on the appropriate balance between competing costs. And by prototyping the
appropriate balance in the context of individual suits, it can provide a framework for more stringent regulation on a national scale, just as nineteenth-century nuisance law provided a blueprint for the Weber Bill in Pittsburgh. 221
C. The Expressive and Innovative Value of Holding Polluters Accountable
Even if climate nuisance suits are dismissed on procedural technicalities,
they still have expressive value by asserting the beliefs of a municipal community in court. Today, many Americans feel that the federal government is doing too little to reduce the effects of climate change. 222 The overwhelming
majority of Americans want to see more restrictions in place on power plant
emissions, the implementation of a carbon tax program, and stricter fuel-efficiency standards for cars. 223 In the absence of a strong response from the federal government, nuisance lawsuits allow a municipality to take control and
protect the health and welfare of its citizens.
Public nuisance actions are the “common law of the police power,” a manner of protecting the people against violations of their health, welfare, and
safety through the courts. 224 Beyond simply shifting the cost of harm from one

217. See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 127–128 and accompanying text.
219. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 212, at 1102.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 151–153 and accompanying text.
222. According to the Pew Research Center, in 2020, sixty-five percent of Americans believed the government should be doing more to address climate change, and seventy-nine percent of Americans would like to see the country shift its energy supply to “developing alternative
sources of energy, such as wind and solar.” Alec Tyson & Brian Kennedy, Two-Thirds of Americans Think Government Should Do More on Climate, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 23, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2020/06/23/two-thirds-of-americans-think-governmentshould-do-more-on-climate [perma.cc/P75M-NMAF].
223. Id.
224. FREUND, supra note 112, at 66.
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party to another, tort law also has a profound expressive value. 225 The message
sent in a tort case is simple but important: “[t]he defendant wronged the plaintiff.” 226 Through these moral messages, tort law ensures that plaintiffs are
treated with dignity in society. 227 In this sense, climate nuisance suits are a way
of putting force behind the beliefs of a local community, who overwhelmingly
wish to see more action taken against oil companies. The value holds regardless of the outcome of the suits. 228
Climate nuisance suits also have an innovative value because they put financial pressure on industry through litigation costs and potential damage
awards, making it more costly to pollute. As history demonstrates, the smoke
abatement movement found eventual success through the invention and wide
dissemination of abatement technologies. 229 In Ben Pontin’s historical analysis of the adoption of clean technology in the nineteenth century, he notes that
nuisance law put pressure on corporations to invent clean technology where
it did not yet exist. 230 Nuisance law was a critical driver in the creation of a
“multi-million-pound market in pollution abatement technology” in nineteenth-century Britain. 231 The technologies that grew from the collective investment would have been inconceivable to scientists and corporations alike
when the first rounds of nuisance lawsuits were brought, just like the potential
innovations in green technology might seem impossible today. Putting pressure on the fossil fuel industry through common law and legislative regulation
alike may lead to the kind of innovation that abated the nineteenth-century
smoke problem, which at the time seemed just as insurmountable as our climate problems today.

225. See Scott Hershovitz, Treating Wrongs as Wrongs: An Expressive Argument for Tort
Law, 10 J. TORT L. 405 (2017).
226. Id. at 406.
227. Id. at 419 (“That is, tort is a way for us to make sure that [the plaintiff] enjoys the
dignity to which he is morally entitled.”).
228. The idea that climate nuisance suits have an important, expressive value is not without criticism. For instance, in 2019, at a Rule of Law Defense Fund panel, a critic of climate
nuisance suits described the role of the municipalities bringing suit as “weaponizing local public
nuisance laws to drive national and international policy.” Walter Olson and Andrew M. Grossman
Participate in the Event, “Climate Change Litigation and Public Nuisance Lawsuits,” hosted by the
Rule of Law Defense Fund, CATO INST., at 01:31–01:37 (Oct. 17, 2019), https://www.cato.org/multimedia/media-highlights-tv/walter-olson-andrew-m-grossman-participate-event-climate-change
(remarks of Alan Wilson, Att’y Gen. of South Carolina). Another critic described the lawsuits as
a poorly thought out “roll of the dice.” Id. at 15:35–15:41 (remarks of Andrew Grossman). These
views, commonly shared by conservative legal scholars, discredit the positive expressive role
these suits can bring regardless of the outcome.
229. See supra Section II.C.
230. See Common Law Clean Up, supra note 160, at 197.
231. Id.
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CONCLUSION
On December 20, 2019, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ordered
the country’s government to slash greenhouse gas emissions by twenty-five
percent by the end of 2020, lauded as “the strongest decision ever” on climate
change. 232 Michael Gerrard, a professor at Columbia Law School who studies
climate change law, calculated that before the suit, there were 1,442 lawsuits
challenging climate change around the world. 233 What, exactly, was the value
of the 1,441 suits filed before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands issued its
decision?
As this Comment has shown, these earlier suits, like the climate nuisance
suits being brought in the United States today, have an inherent value in shifting our schemas of what is an acceptable level of pollution and what is not. It
is my hope that by providing better historical context for the current public
nuisance suits, this Comment not only highlights their importance in the story
of solving the problems of climate change, but also provides a better understanding of why losing today may lead to lasting change tomorrow.

232. John Schwartz, In ‘Strongest’ Climate Ruling Yet, Dutch Court Orders Leaders to Take
Action, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/climate/netherlandsclimate-lawsuit.html [perma.cc/MKD2-6AAC].
233. Id.

